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1 Pensions and the Labor Market
INTRODUCTION
The study of internal labor markets, also known as "the new eco 
nomics of personnel," has made important contributions to labor eco 
nomics. This research has attempted to explain policies governing 
employee-employer relationships when the job match is productive 
and durable, addressing such questions as, What is the economic basis 
for durable employment relationships? How can compensation and 
promotion policies provide incentives to attract and motivate quality 
employees? When job matches are productive, how can wages and 
benefits simultaneously allocate productivity gains and discourage 
quits and layoffs?
Internal labor market research is in the spirit of the "new institu 
tional economics" (Simon 1991), in that a frequent theme is modeling 
labor market practices and policies as efficient and productivity- 
enhancing solutions to the incentive problems that arise from asym 
metric or incomplete information. Economists have applied this 
approach to wage and employment factors such as earnings that rise 
with tenure, interindustry wage differentials, promotions and bonuses, 
and incentives for early retirement. 1
Pensions are one of the most important workplace institutions. 
Nearly half of all private-sector employees participate in a retirement 
plan, and pension costs are approximately 5 percent of payroll for the 
sponsoring firms (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1994). Most studies of 
private pensions have focused on the advantages of saving for retire 
ment through a pension. Pensions provide a large and growing share 
of income for retirees: 44 percent of all households with persons above 
age 65 received pension income in 1994 (Grad 1996), and this figure is 
estimated to rise to 76 percent by 2018 (Silverman and Yakoboski 
1994). Private pension plans paid $179.4 billion in benefits in 1994 
(EBRI 1997), almost one-third of total retirement payments, and pro 
vided 9 percent of total income for the elderly (Grad 1996).
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The internal labor market perspective suggests that pensions, in 
addition to providing a vehicle for retirement saving, establish incen 
tives that promote productivity. The defined-benefit plan which, 
despite recent trends to greater defined-contribution coverage, is still 
the dominant form of coverage typically rewards long tenure and 
penalizes late retirement. Employees covered by a defined-benefit plan 
maximize their pension wealth by working without breaks in tenure 
until they reach retirement age. A pension loss is incurred by leaving 
either "too early" or "too late." Defined-contribution pensions, by their 
construction, are more neutral towards quit or retirement decisions. 2
This monograph applies the internal labor market perspective to pri 
vate pension incentives. The popularity of defined-benefit coverage- 
well over half of the workers with pensions still are covered by these 
plans argues that pension incentives have important economic func 
tions. Because private pensions are voluntary, and given the availabil 
ity of defined-contribution plans that offer a simpler, lower-cost 
retirement savings vehicle, defined-benefit plans must convey distinct 
advantages. The internal labor market perspective suggests that one of 
the advantages is incentives for higher productivity.
PERSPECTIVES ON PENSIONS
Demand-Side
Why do employers compensate their employees with pensions? A 
large body of research has explored both demand- and supply-oriented 
theories of pension coverage. 3 Demand-side theories start from the 
proposition that employers are indifferent between paying cash wages 
or making contributions to a pension fund, and thus pensions are spon 
sored to satisfy employee demand for a retirement saving vehicle. A 
reduction in income taxes is a well-known reason for employees to pre 
fer pension saving. Employer contributions and the interest and divi 
dend earnings of pension assets are not taxed until benefits are paid. 
Therefore, compensating workers by credibly promising future pen 
sion benefits, rather than the equivalent value of cash wages, can yield 
important tax savings, especially for high-income employees. There is
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much empirical evidence that pension coverage responds to tax incen 
tives.4
Another demand-side theory is that pensions are an insurance policy 
against a number of retirement-age risks. One such risk is that retirees 
will live longer than expected and their savings will be depleted before 
death. The market solution to this risk is an annuity, which pays a fixed 
sum as long as the individual is alive. Adverse selection problems 
arise, however, when annuities are purchased late in life, because older 
persons in poor health will refuse to purchase annuities. Pensions 
solve this problem by requiring workers to, in effect, purchase a retire 
ment annuity when they accept a job and begin participating in the 
plan. At this younger age, differences in expected lifespans are less 
evident.
A third reason why workers prefer pension saving is to shift the risk 
of poor investment performance to the employer. The employer 
appears to assume the risk of adverse asset performance in a defined- 
benefit plan by promising a retirement benefit based upon the worker's 
earnings, rather than the value of the pension fund. If future earnings 
are less variable than asset prices, employees enjoy greater certainty 
about retirement living standards under defined-benefit plans. 5
Other demand-centered pension theories are that economies of scale 
in administering private pensions allow workers to earn higher rates of 
return, net of expenses, by group retirement saving (Mitchell and 
Andrews 1981); and that unions prefer pensions because they dispro 
portionately benefit members with greater seniority (Freeman 1985). 
Evidence that pension coverage, especially through defined-benefit 
plans, is more likely in large, unionized establishments supports these 
theories (Dorsey 1987, for example).
While there are many demand-side theories of defined-benefit plans, 
most defined-contribution plans are consistent only with tax savings. 6 
These plans create a retirement account to which the employer or 
employee make regular contributions. Benefits are based upon the 
value of the assets in the account at retirement, unlike defined-benefit 
plans, which pay an annuity based upon age, earnings, or years of ser 
vice. Retirees also may elect a lump-sum benefit, unlike most defined- 
benefit participants.
Yet, demand-side theories do not address the incentives created by 
pensions, particularly by defined-benefit plans. The tax savings aspect
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could be exploited with the administratively simpler defined-contribu- 
tion plan, and defined-benefit plans could shift risk to employers, with 
age- and earnings-based annuities, without imposing quit or late retire 
ment penalties.
Supply-Side
A supply-side perspective is that pension incentives raise workforce 
productivity and lower labor costs. Internal labor market theories sug 
gest several mechanisms through which pensions promote productiv 
ity. The nonportability of defined-benefit pension wealth penalizes 
quits, an incentive which may promote investments in employee train 
ing. The threat of loss of pension benefits also may discourage shirk 
ing and lower the cost of monitoring employee effort. Pensions, 
whether defined-benefit or defined-contribution, are valued more by 
workers who have low internal discount rates. Many have suggested 
that such forward-looking persons are more productive long-term 
employees.7 In addition, defined-benefit plans are a convenient vehicle 
for rewarding early retirement. With mandatory retirement rules no 
longer legal, pension bonuses are perhaps the only feasible way to 
encourage the early exit of older workers, whose productivity may 
have declined or become more variable.
An alternative supply-side perspective is based on the ability to 
underfund defined-benefit pensions. Underfunding, by definition 
impossible in defined-contribution plans, converts employees into 
unsecured bondholders. Ippolito (1986) has argued that this creates an 
incentive for group productivity gains, particularly in union settings. 
Some financial economists see underfunding as a less expensive source 
of financing than borrowing from outsiders, given imperfect informa 
tion in credit markets. 8
The supply-side view that pensions enhance productivity is prima 
rily a theory of defined-benefit plans, because of the latter's ease of 
establishing incentives for tenure and retirement. Defined-contribution 
plans, however, also can attract workers who have low discount rates. 
Recent empirical pension studies suggest that defined-contribution 
plans also promote favorable labor market outcomes, such as reduced 
quits.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRODUCTIVITY THEORY 
OF PENSIONS
Economic studies of pensions frequently assume that defined-bene- 
fit pensions raise productivity.9 This supply-side view follows from the 
economist's presumption that pension incentives must create value suf 
ficient to offset their costs. Constraints on workers' ability to move to 
more attractive jobs or to retire when they wish are costly, requiring 
employers to pay compensating wage premiums to attract workers. In 
firms where pension incentives serve no productive function, employ 
ers could attract workers at a lower cost by offering defined-contribu- 
tion pensions. Alternatively, sponsors could write plan rules to 
increase benefit portability and to eliminate late retirement penalties. 
This reasoning implies that defined-benefit pensions are part of a com 
pensation package in jobs where long tenure or early retirement is pro 
ductive.
In contrast, outside the economics literature, the possibility that pen 
sions may be a tool to enhance productivity is ignored or explicitly dis 
counted in much of the discussion of pensions and pension policy. The 
human resource management perspective almost exclusively sees pen 
sions as driven by employee preferences. For example, we reviewed 
several current human resource management college textbooks and 
found little discussion of the implications of different pension plan 
types for turnover or retirement decisions. Some texts failed even to 
describe the implications of the different incentive structures of 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. 10 No book that we 
reviewed integrated pensions into discussions of designing strategic 
compensation systems. 11 The imperfect portability of benefits gener 
ally was presented as a disadvantage of defined-benefit plans, rather 
than as an intentional compensation policy. Pensions generally were 
discussed in the context of employee benefits, with attention strictly on 
providing for employees' retirement security, and nonportable benefits 
can lower pension wealth. This is a perspective in which pensions are 
exclusively a vehicle for providing retirement income.
The human resource management professional literature also is 
largely silent on the possible advantages of pension incentives. One of 
the authors searched the human resource professional journals and
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found little research on the effect of pension plan choices on employee 
outcomes or performance (Dorsey 1995). Issues of equity and ade 
quacy of replacement rates dominated the discussion of pension plan 
design. Again, nonportability was treated as a shortcoming of defined- 
benefit plans. 12
Human resource professionals also assign little value to pension ten 
ure incentives. Most, however, appreciate the ability of defined-benefit 
plans to encourage early retirement. The following statement by Marc 
W. Twinney, an administrator of a large pension fund, is fairly repre 
sentative of the opinions of benefit professionals:
The primary reason larger, international manufacturing firms pro 
vide private pensions is to remove the older, less efficient 
employee from the work force in a socially responsible way. 
Firms do not provide pensions to recruit... . (or) to tie employees 
to the work force and avoid recruiting or training costs. The fact 
that this occurs is incidental to the primary goal. These secondary 
effects result from controlling the costs of providing retirement 
income and are acceptable to the firm and its employees. (Schmitt 
1993, p. 98.)
Lazear (1990) also concluded that benefit managers primarily under 
stand pensions as retirement savings vehicles, suggesting that they fre 
quently fail even to understand the implications of pension incentives 
on work force outcomes, let alone see them as having strategic value.
Economics is about incentives, so it is not surprising that economists 
are more likely to think about why pension tenure and retirement 
incentives might be useful to firms and workers. Even the economics 
literature, however, often has characterized pension quit penalties as 
impediments to efficient job mobility. Turner (1993) describes two 
arguments for legislation to enhance pension portability. First, greater 
portability will raise retirement benefits of workers who, for whatever 
reason, have experienced frequent or untimely job changes. Second, 
reduced quits induced by nonportability lowers productivity by tying 
workers to jobs where their productivity has fallen due to shifts in con 
sumer tastes or technology shocks.
The latter concern, popularly known as "job lock," has been around 
for some time. Ross (1958) labeled it the "new industrial feudalism." 
Choate and Linger (1986, p. 245) wrote, "Weaknesses in pension avail 
ability, benefits, and portability are now impeding the mobility that is
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so essential during this period of economic and technological turbu 
lence, as an aging work force avoids job changes to protect pension 
rights." The claim that nonportability restricts productive job changes 
implies that pensions are motivated by tax and insurance functions and 
that incentives for long tenure are perhaps an historical accident based 
upon early optimistic assessments of their beneficial effects and pre 
served by institutional rigidity.
The productive value of pension incentives is an important issue in 
the economics of pensions and for evaluating pension policy. Consider 
the debate over pension portability policy. For the past 20 years, the 
United States and Canada have moved toward increasing retirement 
benefit portability. In the United States, the minimum vesting period 
has been lowered twice since 1975 and currently stands at five years. 
Most Canadian provinces now require vesting in defined-benefit plans 
after two years. In addition to mandating greater portability in defined- 
benefit plans, changes in tax and regulatory policy in the United States 
have increased the attractiveness of defined-contribution plans (Clark 
and McDermed 1990), which are by definition more portable. 13 Pen 
sion reform advocates continue to argue for higher portability stan 
dards for defined-benefit pensions. Mandatory portability may raise 
the value of workers' pension wealth 14 and promote job mobility. If 
pension incentives promote long tenure where the latter is productive, 
however, greater portability will have a cost.
An understanding of the productivity view of pensions also is 
needed to interpret and evaluate coverage trends. Primary coverage by 
defined-benefit plans declined from 87 percent of participants in 1975 
to 57 percent in 1993. While the defined-benefit coverage remains 
important, the shift raises important questions. Do plan sponsors 
believe that pension incentives are less important today, i.e., have the 
productivity gains from defined-benefit plans diminished? Or do ris 
ing costs of administering these plans, fueled by federal regulations, 
explain much of the trend? If the latter, does the substitution of 
defined-contribution coverage imply weaker employee/firm attachment 
and lower productivity? Will this trend continue, with defined-benefit 
plans eventually becoming obsolete?
Finally, a clearer understanding of the importance of pension incen 
tives provides a stronger foundation for future pension research. This 
monograph will review labor market models which feature long-term
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employment and will survey previous empirical pension studies. An 
important outcome will be suggestions for future research. We will 
present some new empirical results; however, extensive testing of the 
productivity theory of pensions will require a major investment in data 
collection.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISCUSSION
Our analysis of the productivity theory of pensions is in three parts. 
First, we review the history and institutional practices of private pen 
sions and government policy towards pensions. Chapter 2 traces the 
origins of private pensions in the United States and the evolution of 
current coverage. Tax rules and regulations have had a major impact 
on pensions, and this chapter concludes with an overview of federal 
policies. Chapter 3 describes institutional pension practices which cre 
ate incentives. We show how workers who leave a job that has a 
defined-benefit pension are penalized. The advantages of defined-ben- 
efit plans in establishing retirement incentives also are presented. We 
also discuss more recent ideas about how defined-contribution plans 
may convey productive incentives.
Second, we consider whether pension incentives are consistent with 
models of internal labor markets. Chapter 4 reviews employment mod 
els in which specific training and monitoring costs generate job-spe 
cific productivity gains. Mechanisms to discourage early quitting or 
late retirement are needed to enforce long-term employment contracts. 
We compare pension incentives with ideal solutions.
Third, we evaluate empirical evidence that pensions promote pro 
ductivity. Chapter 5 reviews empirical studies which test the pension- 
productivity hypothesis. We find little direct evidence that pensions 
enhance productivity, but a number of studies provide indirect evi 
dence consistent with the hypothesis. This chapter also takes up the 
question of the growing popularity of defined-contribution plans and 
considers whether the declining market share of defined-benefit plans 
is evidence that pension incentives are no longer important.
The next two chapters report new empirical evidence. Chapter 6 
tests a channel through which pensions may enhance worker produc-
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tivity: by promoting investments in worker training. We created a new 
data set by matching Current Population Surveys, allowing us to test 
the prediction of the specific-training model that pensions and training 
are complements. Chapter 7 reports direct estimates of productivity 
gains for firms that sponsor defmed-benefit pensions. We estimate 
parameters of a production function using firm data from the Com- 
pustat file. These are pieces of evidence which advance the empirical 
literature, but significant data and modeling issues will remain.
We will disappoint readers looking for a single, definitive test of the 
productivity theory versus other pension theories. The ideal empirical 
study would be based on a structural model of pension coverage, labor 
force outcomes, and productivity (Figure 1.1). Such a model would 
recognize that pension coverage is endogenous and would test the 
importance of productivity factors against demand-side theories of 
why firms sponsor pensions. It simultaneously would estimate the 
channels through which pension incentives raised productivity, as sug 
gested by long-term employment models: e.g., by encouraging 
employee training. Finally, it would link improved labor force out 
comes to productivity gains. No data set exists which will support 
such a powerful test. 15 This should not be too surprising, given that 
such a data set would allow tests of more basic and direct incentives, 
such as wage policies, that also have eluded economists.
Although our goals are less ambitious than estimating a fully speci 
fied structural model, they are still important: to analyze and explain 
thoroughly the channels through which pensions may promote produc 
tivity; to summarize the existing literature; to advance the empirical lit 
erature with new results; and to help frame future empirical work.
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NOTES
1. An excellent discussion of applying competitive market solutions to internal labor 
market problems of imperfect information and moral hazard is found in Lazear 
(1991). Carmichael (1989) provides a concise discussion of implicit labor con 
tracts. Another fine nontechnical discussion of the internal labor market perspec 
tive is Wachter and Wright (1990).
2. After workers are vested, quit costs are zero in most defined-contribution plans. 
While it may be possible to increase contribution rates with age and tenure, the tax 
advantages of deferring compensation under defined-benefit plans are large com 
pared with backloaded contributions or deferred wages. The reasons why defined- 
benefit plans are a superior vehicle for establishing tenure and retirement incen 
tives are explored in Chapter 3.
3. For surveys of this literature, see Bodie (1990) and Gustman, Mitchell, and Stein- 
meier (1994).
4. Cross-section analyses show a large positive effect of income on pension coverage 
(Dorsey 1982). Alpert (1983), Woodbury and Huang (1991), and Reagan and 
Turner (1994) report that the likelihood of coverage rises with marginal tax rates.
5. Pesando and Hyatt (1992), however, point out that defined-benefit plans do not 
necessarily shield employees from investment risk. They present evidence that 
when lower investment earnings require higher pension contributions, employers 
reduce wage increases or other benefits. There also is direct evidence that ad hoc 
inflation adjustments are more likely when pension fund returns are high (Alien, 
Clark, and McDermed 1992), causing real pension benefits to fall when unex 
pected inflation lowers asset returns.
6. Defined-contribution plans in theory could prohibit lump-sum distributions. In 
practice, 96 percent of defined-contribution beneficiaries in 1989 received at least 
a portion of their benefits as a lump-sum distribution (Turner and Beller 1992).
7. See Ippolito (1998). There is a large body of research in the field of psychology 
which indicates that individuals who are able to delay gratification achieve higher 
levels of success (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989).
8. Of course, the reduction in financing costs must be sufficient to offset the tax 
losses when the firm's real pension obligations are underfunded.
9. These studies include, for example, Rice (1966), Blinder (1982), Long and Scott 
(1982), Ippolito (1986), Alien and Clark (1987), Even and Macpherson (1996), 
and Curme and Even (1995).
10. The most detailed presentations of pension incentives was found in Miner and 
Crane (1995).
11. An exception was Noe et al. (1994), who wrote that "The typical pension is 
designed to discourage employee turnover'' (p. 644, our emphasis). They also 
note the importance of pensions as severance payments for firms that are reducing 
the size of their workforce. To provide some perspective, these texts also place 
less emphasis than labor economics on the incentive functions of wages and com- 
pensation policies in general. For example, there also was little mention of
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deferred wages or efficiency wages in chapters on turnover or strategic compensa 
tion.
12. For example, Brennan (1984), in an article on restructuring corporate pension 
plans, recommended switching to a career-average benefit formula to enhance the 
portability of the defined-benefit plan.
13. These trends have been less evident in Canada; however, recent policy changes 
have caused concern that defined-benefit plans may begin to lose popularity there 
as well.
14. Employers may respond to portability requirements by lowering the generosity of 
pensions. Thus, legislation may have no effect on pension wealth or costs.
15. Gustman and Mitchell (1992) present a detailed discussion of the data needed to 
test a structural model of pension coverage. Data that are currently available fall 
well short of these requirements.
